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One Nation’s Humanitarian Intervention is 
Another’s Illegal Aggression: How to Govern 
International Responsibility in the Face of 
Civilian Suffering 
ALEXANDRA T. STEELE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
In February 2011, a civilian uprising demanding governmental 
reform and the displacement of longtime leader Colonel Muammar 
Qaddafi emerged in Libya.1 By mid-February, Qaddafi had instituted a 
regime of military force and violence in opposition to the uprising.2 In 
Tripoli, the military used gunfire to “disperse thousands of protestors 
who streamed out of mosques after prayers” and mounted a challenge to 
the government’s crackdown.3 Quickly, what appeared to be an 
organized core of antigovernment opponents emerged and the rebel 
army asserted itself as an alternative to Qaddafi’s rule.4 By the end of 
February, the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) unanimously 
adopted Resolution 1970, condemning violence and human rights 
violations, calling the Resolution “a vital step—a clear expression of the 
will of a united community of nations.”5 On March 1, 2011, the United 
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 1. Alan Cowel, Protests Take Aim at Leader of Libya, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 16, 2011), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/world/middleeast/17libya.html?_r=0. 
 2. Kareem Fahim & David D. Kirpatrick, Gaddafi Makes Surprise Appearance as Protests 
Continue, NDTV (Feb. 26, 2011), http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/gaddafi-makes-surprise-
appearance-as-protests-continue-87975. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Press Release, Security Council, In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council Imposes 
Tough Measures on Libyan Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on 
Protesters, U.N. Press Release SC/10187 (Feb. 26, 2011) [hereinafter Tough Measures on Libyan 
Regime], available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10187.doc.htm. 
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States Senate adopted Resolution 85, which further condemned violence 
and human rights violations, called on Qaddafi to desist from violence, 
and called on the UNSC to institute a no-fly zone over Libyan territory.6 
By mid–March, others in the Muslim world including the African 
Union, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Council of 
the League of Arab States, joined in condemning Libya and urged 
imposition of a no-fly zone.7  
Qaddafi failed to comply with Resolution 1970. In response, the 
UNSC passed Security Council Resolution 1973 authorizing a no-fly 
zone over Libya and empowering member states to take “all necessary 
measures” to enforce the ban.8 Once again, Qaddafi failed to comply.9 
On March 19th, 2011, the United States, in conjunction with NATO 
members, launched an air strike to enforce Resolution 1973.10  
As NATO, member states, and the Libyan rebels advanced against 
Qaddafi, and the toppling of the Qaddafi regime appeared imminent, 
post-intervention criticism of NATO and the UNSC emerged.11 While 
many Westerners rejoiced at the end of Qaddafi’s rule and saw it as an 
end to crimes against humanity, others saw NATO and U.S. 
involvement in Libya as nothing more than the advancement of a 
Western political and policy agenda.12   
Questions rise to the surface: was NATO’s mission in Libya really 
humanitarian in nature, or was it an inappropriate intervention in a 
sovereign state’s civil war? If the latter, was this not a violation of 
international law, and in particular, the UN Charter? How does NATO 
decide which parts of the world qualify for their “humanitarian 
intervention” missions? If NATO will enter Libya to protect civilian 
human rights, why was the same not done for Syria? If violations of the 
UN Charter have taken place, as well as potential war crimes in the 
 
 6. Caroline D. Krass, Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. Att’y Gen. 1 
(2011), available at http://justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf.  
 7. Id. 
 8. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ Over Libya, 
Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilian, By Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 
Abstentions, U.N. Doc. SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sr10200.com.htm#Resolution. 
 9. Louis Charbonneau, No Sign Gaddafi Complying with UN Demands: Ban, THOMSON 
REUTERS, Mar. 25, 2011, available at 
http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE72O02E20110325?sp=true. 
 10. Curtis Doebbler, The Use of Force Against Libya: Another Illegal Use of Force, JURIST 
(Mar. 20, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/03/the-use-of-force-against-libya-another-illegal-
use-of-force.php. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id.  
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perpetration of “humanitarian intervention,” what are the available 
remedies?13 Finally, if there are no remedial measures in instances of 
violation, have the UNSC and NATO permanently expanded and 
redefined the “peace and security” exception of the UN Charter with 
regard to the use of force?  
This Note will argue that the “peace and security” exception that 
justified the use of force in Libya and, in particular, its “humanitarian” 
sub-exception, not only sets a dangerous precedent, but also violates 
international law. Part I will set forth the history and the exceptions to 
the use of force in the UN Charter specifically focusing on 
“humanitarian intervention” and its newer, controversial form, the 
“Responsibility to Protect.” Part II will address whether the 
Responsibility to Protect, before and after its implementation in Libya, 
is an emerging norm of customary international law. Part III discusses 
the inherently political nature of decisions to use military force, in 
particular how the international community decides to use military force 
only in select countries. In the case of Libya and Syria, political and 
policy agendas clearly are at the core of that decision despite the UN 
Charter’s express prohibition against such rationale. In particular, the 
article will examine the specific acts of NATO and member states that 
tend to show that the use of force is being used to advance a political 
and policy agenda, in direct contradiction of the requirements of the UN 
Charter.  
Part IV lays out the impact of the Libya intervention on the UNSC, 
and the UN Charter’s prohibition against the use of force. Further, the 
Note argues that revelations surrounding the Libyan intervention pose 
particular challenges to the legitimacy of the Responsibility to Protect 
doctrine, and that in its current form, it threatens to render the Charter’s 
prohibition against the use of force irrelevant.  
Part V proposes remedial measures that delineate and set 
boundaries on actions taken under the Responsibility to Protect. These 
measures would prevent its use as cover by NATO member states to 
advance their own agendas as opposed to serving the doctrine’s true 
purpose to mitigate humanitarian crisis. The remedial measures 
proposed focus on using the tools of the International Criminal Court, 
 
 13. Elena Papadopoulou, The Impact of SC Res. 1970/2011 on the Obligation of UN 
Member States Under the Rome Statute and Some Reflections on the Immunities of Libyan 
Officials, 27 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 731 (2011). While many parties to the UN Charter are 
subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), some members, in 
particular the United States, are not.  
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the International Court of Justice, and the veto power of UNSC voting 
members.  
This Note will conclude that the UN Charter has been violated for 
the following reasons: (1) the Charter requires that members refrain 
from intervening in matters that are primarily domestic (i.e. civil war) 
yet NATO’s Libyan intervention has done just that; (2) the lack of fact-
finding to determine violations of the UNSC Resolutions and human 
rights prior to NATO’s military campaign in the region provides 
insufficient affirmation that the use of force was a measure of last 
resort; and lastly, (3) NATO took the side of the rebels, thus advancing 
a political agenda in direct violation of the Charter. For these reasons, 
the Libyan intervention cannot be justified under the Responsibility to 
Protect. Finally, in order to maintain the integrity of the UN Charter, the 
UN’s political and judicial organs, and the legal standing of the 
Responsibility to Protect, the international legal community must 
develop measures that instill strict limits on further authorization and 
discharge of military intervention under the peace and 
security/humanitarian exception to the long standing jus cogens 
prohibiting the use of force.  
II.  THE HISTORY OF THE UN CHARTER AND THE USE OF FORCE 
A.   The Prohibition Against the Use of Force  
The United Nations Charter, created in 1945, sets out specific 
guidelines and principles for its members.14 Specifically, Article 2(4) 
prohibits the use of force to advance political or policy agendas, “or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.”15 This prohibition is binding “on states both individually and 
as members of international organizations, such as NATO, as well as on 
those organizations themselves.”16 Further, Article 2(7) provides that 
nothing in the UN Charter “shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within domestic jurisdiction 
of any state.”17  
The UN Charter’s prohibition of the use of force carries with it the 
 
 14.  Charter of the United Nations: Introductory Note, UNITED NATIONS, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/intro.shtml (last visited Mar. 15, 2013). 
 15. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 16. Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
1, 3 (1999). 
 17. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. 
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norm of jus cogens – “a principle having status of such a peremptory 
norm” of general international law.18 This is supported “most notably in 
the Nicaragua judgment of the International Court of Justice” (“ICJ”) in 
which the ICJ based its decision on customary international law naming 
the prohibition of the use of force as a “fundamental or cardinal 
principle of such law.”19 Additional judicial organs have analyzed the 
use of force such as the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea.20 
The International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea held that “the use of 
force must be avoided as far as possible and, where force is 
unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in 
the circumstances.”21 
B.  Exceptions to the Use of Force 
Under the UN Charter, the use of force is only permitted in two 
instances.22 The first exception to the prohibition against the use of force 
is self-defense.23 A second, more recently emerging, exception allows 
the use of force when necessary to maintain “peace and security.”24 
From 1990 to 1994, the UNSC considered and passed twice as many 
resolutions as it had in its entire history on what constituted threats to 
international peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
thus expanding it to include humanitarian concerns.25  
1.   Humanitarian Intervention 
The “peace and security” exception that now arguably includes the 
protection of humanitarian interests was, and remains, quite 
controversial.26 The humanitarian intervention exception to the 
 
 18.  NICO SCHRIJVER, Challenges to the Prohibition To Use Force: Does the Straitjacket of 
Article 2(4) UN Charter Begin to Gall Too Much?, in THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE USE OF 
FORCE – THEORY AND REALITY – A NEED FOR CHANGE? 31, 39 (Niels Blokker & Nico 
Schrijver, eds., Martinus NijHoff Publishers, 2005). 
 19. Id.; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 125, ¶ 243 (June 27). 
 20. SCHRIJVER, supra note 18, at 40. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Simma, supra note 16, at 3.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Richard Falk, Preliminary Libyan Scorecard: Acting Beyond the U.N. Mandate, CITIZEN 
PILGRIMAGE (Sept. 6, 2011), http://richardfalk.wordpress.com/2011/09/06/preliminary-libyan-
scorecard-acting-beyond-the-un-mandate/. 
 25.  Rebecca J. Hamilton, Note, The Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine – 
But What of Implementation?, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 289–97 (2006). 
 26. Id.  
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prohibition of the use of force is a tangled web – many argue that the 
use of force for humanitarian purposes should not be denied in cases 
where genuine action is needed.27 Yet “the doctrine is prone to abuse for 
other than humanitarian purposes.”28 The “humanitarian” peace and 
security exception itself has been called a violation of international law 
because while humanitarian intervention “may be an ‘emerging norm,’ 
it is not yet an established principle of international law.”29 In the ICJ’s 
ruling on U.S. military activities in Nicaragua during the 1980s, the 
court declared, “the use of force could not be the appropriate method to 
monitor or ensure such respect [for human rights].”30 Following the 
ICJ’s issuance of its decision in Nicaragua, the United Kingdom 
Foreign Office commented on unauthorized ‘humanitarian 
intervention,’ noting, “its doubtful benefits would be heavily 
outweighed by its costs in terms of respect for international law.”31 
The resistance to “humanitarian intervention” has its basis in the 
UN Charter itself as an instrument of decolonization – extending the 
notion of sovereign equality.32 The resulting legal order represents a 
formal commitment to anti-colonial nationalism, self-determination, and 
to the protection of human rights.33 Critics argue that to use human 
rights as the justification for military intervention of allegedly sovereign 
states is to “betray” the original purpose of the Charter, allowing for and 
protecting the equality of individual states, and is a new form of 
imperial domination.34 
Critics of intervention further claim that the use of force in the 
name of humanitarianism is not truly aimed at protecting human rights, 
but rather about pushing a political or policy agenda.35 Interventions 
undertaken in Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Haiti, Sierra Leone, and 
Kosovo have led many “to posit the emergence of a challenge to the 
 
     27. Id.  
 28. SCHRIJVER, supra note 18, at 39 
 29. Craig Martin, The Legal Implications of Military Intervention in Libya, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/craig-martin/the-legal-implications-
of_b_830089.html.  
 30. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 134–35 (June 27). 
 31. Simma, supra note 16, at 5. 
 32. ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 19–20 (James Crawford, et. al. eds., 2003). 
 33. Id. at 43. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Falk, supra note 24. 
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assumed inviolability of state sovereignty.”36 A report issued by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(“ICISS”) identifies the different tensions at play in the debate on 
intervention:  
For some, the international community is not intervening enough; for 
others it is intervening much too often. For some, the only real issue 
is in ensuring that coercive interventions are effective; for others, 
questions about legality, process and the possible misuse of 
precedent loom much larger. For some, the new interventions herald 
a new world in which human rights trump state sovereignty; for 
others, it ushers in a world in which big powers ride roughshod over 
the smaller ones, manipulating the rhetoric of humanitarianism and 
human rights.37 
A compelling narrative, principally characterized by its 
“humanitarianism,” justifies intervention in sovereign states. This 
humanitarian narrative, equipped with traditional storytelling tools, and 
further embellished by the media – through photos, news bites and 
punditry - has succeeded in presenting a convincing story that appeals to 
deeply engrained Western ideologies of democracy and good and evil.38 
This narrative is primarily heroic in nature,39 calling forth stories of 
“rogue states, ruthless dictators and ethnic tensions as threats to the 
established liberal international order.”40 Those peddling intervention 
craftily paint the UNSC as a benevolent patriarch41 or UN peace-keepers 
as the “[k]night in [w]hite [a]rmour.”42 
Despite arguments against the practice of humanitarian 
intervention, the narrative of justification has won. International law has 
arguably been broken at least twice since Nicaragua. Military force was 
used without UNSC authorization prior to humanitarian intervention in 
both Kosovo and Iraq.43 In the 1999 Kosovo conflict, for example, 
NATO justified intervention by relying on widely accepted norms 
 
 36. Hamilton, supra note 25, at 289. 
 37. Max W. Matthews, Tracking the Emergence of a New International Norm: The 
Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur, 31 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 137, 140 
(2008) (quoting ICISS Report). 
 38. See ORFORD, supra note 32. 
 39. Id. at 158.  
 40. Id. at 164.  
 41. Id. at 167.  
 42. See CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY, KNIGHTS IN WHITE ARMOUR: THE NEW ART OF WAR 
AND PEACE (1997) (discussing UN peace-keepers in the “new world order.”). 
 43. Id.; Abraham D. Sofaer, The International Court of Justice and Armed Conflict, 1 NW. J. 
INTL. HUM RTS. 4 (2004). 
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incorporated in treaties such as the Genocide Convention, the Laws of 
War, and the Geneva Convention.44 Both the interventions in Kosovo 
and Iraq were supported by NATO’s moral authority but conspicuously 
lacked legal authority.45 Legal commentators abashedly duck their 
heads, rationalizing the illegality of humanitarian intervention by 
arguing that “hard cases” do occur, and these hard cases leave state 
actors no choice but to act outside the law.46 Furthermore, these 
circumventions of the international law proscription on the use of force 
have not, as of yet, led to repercussions of any sort.47 
Former Secretary General Kofi Annan delivered a convincing 
blow to the state sovereignty argument in his Millennium Report of 
2000 when he rebuffed the notion that intervention is tantamount to 
meddling with a state’s internal affairs.48 Annan asked: “if humanitarian 
intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how 
should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and 
systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our 
common humanity?”49  
The Independent International Commission on Kosovo further 
highlighted the tension between legality, the need for protection of 
human rights through intervention, and the use of force. It concluded 
that NATO’s use of force against Serbia was “‘illegal, but 
legitimate.’”50 Given the level of dissent by critics of intervention in 
places like Kosovo, and the failed attempts at intervention in places like 
Rwanda, it became clear that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
was due for a facelift. Without a serious re-thinking of the 
interventionist approach, the humanitarian justification could not be 
codified in international law.51 
The convincing and now prevailing voices favoring intervention 
for humanitarian reasons reframed concepts of sovereignty and started 
 
 44. Soafer, supra note 43, ¶ 17. 
 45. Id. ¶ 19. 
 46. ORFORD, supra note 32, at 164.  
 47. Falk, supra note 24, at 4–5.  
 48. U.N. Secretary General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st 
Century: Rep. of the Secretary-General, 48, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (Sept. 6–8, 2000) [hereinafter 
United Nations, We the Peoples].  
 49. Id. 
 50. INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT: 
CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 4 (2000). 
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to develop a potentially more palatable doctrine.52 Instances of illegal 
but justified violations of international law would now be delineated, 
and defined in an acceptable manner. A new prism through which to 
address these issues and attempt – or, at least appear – to act in 
compliance with international law was conceived. Thus came the 
introduction of the Responsibility to Protect.53   
2.  The Responsibility to Protect 
In 2001, international rights leaders affiliated with the ICISS, 
issued a report on the Responsibility to Protect. The report was intended 
to reconcile the many problems with humanitarian intervention, define 
the international community’s responsibilities in the face of crimes 
against humanity, and formulate a legal and humane framework for 
when and how intervention should be implemented.54 In 2005, at the 
60th session of the UN General Assembly, the member states 
“unanimously endorsed” the Responsibility to Protect.55 The 
Responsibility to Protect requires member states to protect the world’s 
populations from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity” which “are deemed to be part of international jus 
cogens.”56  
The framers of the doctrine argued that the Responsibility to 
Protect is foundationally “consistent with the core claims of 
sovereignty.”57 Fundamental to the notion of State sovereignty is a 
responsibility of the State itself to protect the people of the State.58 
When a population is suffering from crimes due to internal conflict, and 
the State is unable, or unwilling, to protect them, the principle (and law) 
 
 52. See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY 
TO PROTECT (2001) (hereinafter ICISS Report).   
 53. See id.   
 54. History and Timeline of R2P, R2P COALITION, 
http://r2pcoalition.org/content/view/22/48/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2013). 
 55. Id.  
 56. Alex J. Bellamy & Paul D. Williams, The New Politics of Protection? Cote d’Ivoire, 
Libya, and the Responsibility to Protect, 87 INT’L. AFFAIRS 824, 827 (2011) (discussing the 
international society’s response to the humanitarian crises in Libya and the Cote d’Ivoire and the 
new politics of protection that has developed over the past decade); Ekkehard Strauss, A Bird in 
the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush, in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, 25, 49, (Alex J. Bellamy, Sara E. Davies & Luke Glanville eds., 2011).  
 57. Edward C. Luck, Sovereignty, Choice and the Responsibility to Protect, THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 14, 17 (Alex J. Bellamy et al. eds., 
2011). 
 58. Int’l Commission On Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, 
Rep. (Dec. 2001) (hereinafter ICISS Report).   
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of non-intervention should “[yield] to the international responsibility to 
protect.”59 Proponents of intervention claim that the issue of State 
sovereignty would be moot unless a State was to insist it had a right to 
commit humanitarian crimes against its people.60 Only in these 
instances, where the claim of sovereignty is illegitimate and illegal, 
might a State interfere. Sovereignty “need not pose a barrier, legally or 
politically, for Responsibility to Protect.”61 Others take a stronger 
position, suggesting that the Responsibility to Protect stands for the 
proposition that national governments do not possess an absolute right 
of sovereignty.  Rather, that right is earned.62  
In 2001, the ICISS and the UN High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges, and Change Report outlined the factors to consider in 
making the decision to intervene.63 The responsibility to use coercive 
military measures only arises when prevention and other coercive but 
non-military measures fail.64 Security Council authorization of military 
action is only considered in extreme circumstances or for “just cause.”65 
Just cause is defined as the “large scale loss of life . . . which is a 
product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to 
act . . . or large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’ . . . carried out by killing, forced 
expulsion, acts of terror or rape.”66 When these situations present 
themselves, the Responsibility to Protect requires sufficient evidence 
and facts to warrant intervention.67 
Where there is cause, but before the Security Council authorizes 
intervention, it must also consider several additional factors: (1) the 
seriousness of the threat, (2) whether the action would be undertaken for 
the proper purpose, (3) whether military action is the last resort, (4) 
whether the action proposed is proportional, and (5) whether the 
consequences of military action outweigh the benefits.68 The 
 
 59. Id.  
 60. Luck, supra note 57, at 17. 
 61. Id.  
 62. Michael Contarino & Selena Lucent, Stopping the Killing: The International Criminal 
Court and Juridical Determination of the Responsibility to Protect, in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 193, 196 (Alex J. Bellamy et al. eds., 2011). 
 63. ICISS Report, supra note 58, at 32. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id. at 29, 32; see also U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility, Rep. of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and 
Change, U.N. Doc A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter U.N. High-Level Report]. 
 66. ICISS Report, supra note 58, at 32.    
 67. Id. at 34.  
 68. U.N. High-level Report, supra note 65, at 67.  
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Responsibility to Protect comes with the post-intervention obligation to 
ensure that the problems that provoked intervention do not recur or 
resurface.69 The development of this specific framework has paved the 
way for the Responsibility to Protect to become international law. 
III.  THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AS AN EMERGING NORM  
OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW PRIOR  
TO NATO’S INTERVENTION IN LIBYA 
The ICJ defines customary law as “the general practice accepted as 
law.”70 “[C]ustomary law may come into existence by virtue of State 
practice, which entails elements of consistency of practice, generality of 
practice and duration, as well as opinio juris.”71 Gareth Evans, the main 
author of the Responsibility to Protect ICISS report, stated, “There is 
not yet a sufficiently strong basis to claim the emergence of . . . 
something as formal as a new principle of customary international 
law.”72 Furthermore, “while the original ICISS report did not explicitly 
call for legal reform to enshrine [Responsibility to Protect], the 
Commissioners did leave the impression that international morality and 
international law should be more closely aligned.”73 Evans’ statement 
reflects the hope of the proponents of the humanitarian concept that the 
Responsibility to Protect will in fact become international law.74 Some 
argue that the newly labeled Responsibility to Protect, and the non-
binding general assembly document may satisfy the opinio juris 
requirement.75 Other dedicated champions of the Responsibility to 
Protect go a step further and say that the concept, even prior to Libya, 
backed with the “custom” of humanitarian intervention, is already an 
emerging norm.76 Yet, humanitarian intervention was never a legally 
fortified doctrine.77 It follows then that the Responsibility to Protect is 
not international law.78  
 
 69. ICISS Report, supra note 58, at 39.  
 70. Olof Leps, Responsibility to Protect: A Political Norm or a Customary Law?, PUB. 
POL’Y & L. EU (Jun. 23, 2010), http://quovadiseurope.blogspot.com/2010/06/responsibility-to-
protect-political.html (citing the Statute of the International Court of Justice (San Francisco, June 
26, 1945)).  
 71. ICISS Report, supra note 58, at 39.  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 135.  
 75. Leps, supra note 70.  
 76. Matthews, supra note 37, at 147–48.  
 77. Leps, supra note 70.  
 78. Id. 
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The main factor that prevents the Responsibility to Protect from 
becoming customary law is the inconsistency with which humanitarian 
intervention has been practiced.79 Military operations have often 
commenced without UNSC authorization—for example, “the 1999 
NATO aggression against Serbia in the Kosovo conflict was 
unauthorized, illegal and ‘condemned by China, Russia, and India.”80 As 
consistency and state practice are requirements for customary law, 
global condemnation of these recent interventions on the grounds of 
humanitarian crisis weigh against the grant of such status.81 So at this 
point, the Responsibility to Protect remains a mere suggestion, and 
intervention in Libya on this basis is still arguably illegal. The 
implications of the Libyan intervention on the Responsibility to 
Protect’s progress toward customary international law will be discussed 
below. 
IV.  THE INHERENTLY POLITICAL NATURE  
OF DECIDING WHERE TO INTERVENE 
At first glance, the 2011 situation in Libya appeared to be a case 
for international humanitarian intervention.82 Though Qaddafi was 
waging war against Libyans,83 Mary Ellen O’Connell, critic of the 
Responsibility to Protect, argued that it was unclear whether the 
doctrine’s requirement of just cause was truly met.84 When the bombing 
in Libya began, Western leaders compared the situation in Libya to 
Rwanda and Bosnia. O’Connell made the distinction; UN Peacekeepers 
were present in Rwanda to protect unarmed civilians against genocide. 
Qaddafi on the other hand, was arguably fighting a civil war—
insufficient support for just cause.85  
The initial measures, specifically UNSC Resolution 1973 and its 
sanctions, were not allowed to fully take effect before NATO undertook 
military intervention.86 “The intervention was not a last resort. 
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Sanctions, including an arms embargo, had hardly been put in place 
when the bombs began to fly.”87 Despite the Responsibility to Protect’s 
requirement for fact-finding prior to turning to the “last resort,” i.e. 
military intervention, NATO began its mission before definitive 
evidence of Libya’s non-compliance had been proved.88 Libya invited 
international monitors to visit their country, but this invitation was not 
accepted.89 The “[f]act-finding mission by the UN Human Rights 
Council and the Security Council [had] not yet gone to Libya” when 
NATO began military action in March 2011.90  
A.   Political and Economic Interests in the Region  
as Justification for Intervention: Oil and Lockerbie 
According to Gareth Evans, several tests must be met to authorize 
the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect.91 One such test is 
making sure that the primary purpose for the “proposed military action 
is to halt or avert the threat in question.”92 Evans claims that Libya 
passed this test – if the primary motivator to intervene in Libya had 
been regime change or oil, the Arab League or Security Council support 
would never have been achieved.93 Yet many factors contradict Evans’ 
contention.  
The Centre International de Recherches et d’Etudes sur La 
Terrorisme & l’Aide au Victimes du Terrorisme94 Report (“CIRET – 
AVT”) holds that because Libya is an oil rich country, NATO, 
particularly the United States, has an interest in seeing a cooperative, 
NATO-friendly regime in Libya.95 Libya possesses the largest oil 
reserves in Africa and, before the uprising, was the world’s 12th largest 
oil exporter, though mostly to European markets.96 Even in recent years, 
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the United States has considered Qaddafi a quasi-ally, albeit a 
potentially unreliable one. In 2004, President Bush negotiated with 
Qaddafi to ensure the United States would have a stake in the portion of 
Libya’s oil reserves that were previously unavailable to the U.S. oil 
industry.97 To tap this reserve, President Bush lifted the economic 
sanctions against Libya that had been in place since the 1988 Lockerbie 
bombing.98  
During the 1970s, Libya’s oil output had soared to three million 
barrels a day.99 By 2004 this number decreased drastically to just about 
1.5 million barrels a day.100 Qaddafi hoped that in exchange for his 
promise to renounce nuclear weapons and terrorism, the introduction of 
U.S. oil companies back into the region would lift Libya’s sagging oil 
production.101 As time passed, it became clear that Qaddafi was not as 
cooperative as the United States would have liked.102 In 2007, it became 
evident that the Libyan leader was making a push for Libyan resource 
nationalism—“Labor laws were amended to ‘Libyanize’ the economy, 
and oil firms were pressed to hire Libyan managers, finance people and 
human resources directors.”103 A U.S. State Department cable read: 
“Those who dominate Libya’s political and economic leadership are 
pursuing increasingly nationalistic policies in the energy sector that 
could jeopardize efficient exploitation of Libya’s extensive oil and gas 
reserves.”104  
Tension continued to mount between the United States and 
Qaddafi.105 In 2008, the U.S. Congress passed a bill that allowed easier 
access to reparations for the surviving families of the Lockerbie 
bombings.106 According to the State Department cable, Libya threatened 
 
Economy, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 23, 2011), www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/23/libya-
gaddafi-obama-economy_n_933837.html. 
 97. Steven Mufson, Conflict in Libya: U.S. Oil Companies Sit on the Sidelines as Gaddafi 
Maintains Hold, WASH. POST (June 10, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/conflict-in-libya-us-oil-companies-sit-on-
sidelines-as-gaddafi-maintains-hold/2011/06/03/AGJq2QPH_story_2.html. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id.  
 101. Id.  
 102. Id.  
 103. Id.   
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. (noting that the U.S. passed a bill to make it easier for victims of the Lockerbie 
Bombings to go after Libyan assets, making Qaddafi “livid”).   
 106. Id. 
 
2012] How to Govern International Responsibility 113 
to significantly curtail its oil production to penalize the United States.107 
Oil prices began to creep upward, “which spiked globally in February 
[2011] as the flow of oil from Libya dried to a trickle.”108 Indeed, this 
posed problems for the oil dependent and ailing U.S. economy.109 
Qaddafi’s decreased willingness to participate “efficiently” in oil 
exportation became a significant motive for the United States and other 
NATO allies to want Qaddafi expunged from Libya.110 With Qaddafi 
gone, the country’s oil production could go back “online.”111  
This strategy successfully led to a drop in the price of oil – “the 
news of the rebels’ success [affected] Brent crude, which is used to 
price many international oil varieties, dropping 92 cents.”112 With 
President Obama’s approval rating suffering due to the economy,113 U.S. 
involvement in the successful deposing of Qaddafi made an appealing 
additive for the President’s political punch as the 2012 election neared.  
In addition to the U.S. interest in Libya’s oil reserves, the United 
States was concerned with China’s growing influence in the region.114 
Further, because China had made significant investments in energy in 
Libya, military intervention in Libya first provided an excuse to 
evacuate the twenty-nine thousand Chinese who live there, and 
secondly to ensure the replacement of China-friendly Qaddafi with a 
new regime less favorable to China.115  
For the UnitedStates, oil and financial gain were not the only 
reasons to seek a new regime in Libya. The Libyan perpetrators of the 
1988 Pan Am Flight bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland116 still remain 
unpunished.117 In September 2011, four republican U.S. Senators visited 
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the post-Qaddafi Libya and “raised the delicate subject of prosecuting” 
the Lockerbie bombers.118  
With its considerable influence, due to disproportionate financial 
and human contributions to NATO military actions, these looming U.S. 
interests were likely a driving force behind the decision to move past 
initial coercive measures.119 
B.   Libya, but Not Syria, Bahrain, or Yemen 
Some argue that the UNSC and NATO are inconsistent, even 
hypocritical, in their application of the Responsibility to Protect.120 
Continued “U.S. support of the Yemeni and Bahraini regimes as they 
brutally suppress nonviolent pro-democracy protesters raises questions 
as to why the U.S. [was] so quick to intervene militarily against the 
Libyan regime suppressing an armed rebellion by those whose 
commitment to democracy is more suspect.”121 Further, even as 
Qaddafi’s regime was formally ended by his public death, and as his top 
officials are now facing prosecution by the ICC,122 NATO’s Secretary 
General announced in October 2011 that NATO had “[n]o intention 
whatsoever” to enter Syria.123 Several factors have been cited as the 
reasoning behind NATO’s decision to intervene in Libya and not Syria.  
Director of research at the Brookings Doha Center in Qatar, Shadi 
Hamid, opined that there is significantly more danger of the Syrian 
regime causing trouble in the region.124 UNSC authorization is 
inherently political in nature and the powerful member states have pull 
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when protecting their interests.125 Intervention in Syria is dangerous for 
the United States becauswe anti-Western sentiment is easily spread in 
the region.126 Well into 2012, Syria’s dictator Assad was still favored by 
Russia and China and his downfall would be a blow to these countries’ 
interests in the Middle East.127 U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, 
alleged that Russia and China remain major arms dealers to Syria.128  
Another reason NATO is reluctant to enter Syria with military 
force comes from the fact that Qaddafi’s security forces fought for six 
months despite “being hammered by NATO airstrikes,” thus 
foreshadowing the possibility of a long, drawn-out, and expensive 
intervention.129 Syria’s military is thought to be much stronger and more 
cohesive than that of Libya and is armed with Russian-made weapons.130  
 Syria is different from Libya in that Libya’s rebel forces provided 
a natural new regime, whereas in Syria, the political landscape is 
splintered and thus could lead to more bloodshed.131 If Syria, with or 
without intervention, “implodes, Iran, Lebanon, Jordan and potentially 
Israel and Iraq would be infected” by the fallout.132 “The Arab League is 
itself divided between Gulf States like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which 
support arming the rebels and toppling Assad, and others who fear that 
ousting Assad would spark sectarian violence that spills over into 
Lebanon and Iraq.”133 While some of this reasoning falls in line with the 
factors considered under the Responsibility to Protect, such as the 
balancing of consequences, other factors appear to have less to do with 
protecting the population of Syria than with the political interests of 
individual member states.  
Other critics of the intervention in Libya argue that if the UNSC, 
NATO, and member states are not willing or able to intervene in all 
countries that need humanitarian protection and intervention, then it is 
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best to stay out altogether, or risk being exposed as political and 
economic opportunists. Non-intervention will preserve parties from 
attack on a legal level as violators of international law and it will protect 
the principle of state sovereignty.  
Alternatively, there are strong arguments for intervention where 
there is both political will and interest. It is better to do something in 
one place, where a humanitarian crisis is under way, than to always 
stand by helping no one.134 The embarrassment, pain, and political 
consequence of doing nothing in Rwanda have convinced many to 
support the uneven disbursement of humanitarian interventionist 
forces.135 At this point, however, inconsistency is a hindrance to the 
development of the Responsibility to Protect as a legal norm. Both the 
international legal and political communities continue to find military 
intervention for humanitarian purposes suspect.  
V.  IMPACT OF THE LIBYA INTERVENTION 
A.   The Libyan Intervention’s Impact on the UNSC’s Relevance  
The UNSC’s relevance and position was seriously set back after 
humanitarian intervention in countries like Kosovo.136 NATO’s exercise 
of force without UNSC authorization weakened the UNSC authority 
over such matters.137 In 2011, Resolution 1973 restored some of the 
UNSC legitimacy as the gatekeeper and decision-making organ to 
authorize the use of force in humanitarian crisis situations.138 Further, 
for the Responsibility to Protect to gain ground in its efforts to achieve 
status as internationally recognized legal doctrine, UNSC authorization 
remains an essential step in establishing a foundation for congruence of 
practice—a necessity for creating a legal norm.139 
B.  The Impact of the Libyan Intervention  
on the Responsibility to Protect  
Proponents of the intervention in Libya continue to argue that the 
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measures taken by NATO and member states were justified under the 
doctrine, despite evidence suggesting that the mission was really based 
on political interest. At least with regard to Libya, NATO took the 
correct measures by obtaining UNSC authorization before 
intervention.140 However, India’s UN Ambassador, Hardeep Singh Puri, 
recently noted, “Libya has given R2P a bad name.”141 The question 
remains whether NATO and member states were able to stay within the 
boundaries of acceptable practices in its intervention. “Many countries 
that opposed the Security Council’s action, and even at least one that 
supported it, now believe the Western operation [went] far beyond 
merely protecting Libyans, and it is now widely being seen as an action 
intended from the start to get rid of the Libyan ruler.”142 By October 
2011, the United States dropped any pretense that participation in the 
Libyan intervention was motivated by humanitarianism when U.S. 
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, addressing Libyans during a visit to 
the country, said that she hoped Qaddafi could be “captured or killed 
soon” – a statement that many took to suggest that political 
assassination was the intended outcome.143  
Regardless of how unpopular Qaddafi might have been, “the idea 
that NATO warplanes were trying to kill him struck a nerve . . . [with] 
countries already suspicious of the responsibility-to-protect concept.”144 
Getting rid of Qaddafi was outside the bounds of what proponents of the 
Responsibility to Protect understood to be the goals or the plan of 
NATO intervention.145 Gareth Evans claimed that eliminating the 
Libyan dictator “was not part of the Security Council consensus.”146  
To many in the international community, NATO’s arming of the 
rebels and deposing of Qaddafi amounted not only to a violation of 
Responsibility to Protect, but also of the UN Charter. While the desire 
to prevent humanitarian atrocity underlies the Responsibility to Protect 
doctrine, its façade is tarnished, making further UNSC Resolutions 
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under the theory unlikely. The first legitimate attempt to implement the 
Responsibility to Protect went too blatantly awry.147 If the 
Responsibility to Protect in its current form and application retains a 
foothold in the international community as the doctrine under which the 
UNSC can authorize the use of force, then the exception to the use of 
force under the UN Charter will not only be eviscerated but rendered 
irrelevant. 
C.  The Impact of the Libyan Intervention on the UN Charter  
and The Prohibition on the Use of Force 
The UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force has been slowly 
eroded for many years as the “two main Charter exceptions to the 
prohibition to use force are not cast in iron language, but are subject to 
evolving albeit not unlimited interpretations in response to new global 
threats and changing needs of the international community.”148 
Proponents of the idea that the prevention of human rights violations 
and genocide are themselves jus cogens—thus providing a stronger 
basis for institutionalizing the Responsibility to Protect - tout UNSC-
authorized intervention in Libya as a victory for the concept, moving it 
closer to acceptance as customary international law.149 This proposition 
is inherently problematic given the manner in which the intervention 
was undertaken. Outright acceptance of this proposition is a serious 
threat to the jus cogens status of another highly valuable UN Charter 
concept – the prohibition of the use of force.  
Humanitarian intervention, and now the Responsibility to Protect, 
is, on the surface, driven by the altruistic intentions of intervening 
States. Neither, however, can be extricated from the competing and 
prohibited intentions of those same States. In the instant case, the 
prohibited intent rose to the surface and seized control of the 
intervention. The United States’ fervent denial of regime change as the 
objective of the Libya operation did not, and could not, last. The 
international political importance of keeping those intentions buried was 
trumped by domestic political strategy as the 2012 election approached; 
Secretary Clinton herself chose to make a public showing of the U.S. 
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desire to get rid of the bad guy, thus illegitimating the humanitarian 
purpose under which the use of force was originally authorized.150 
Scholar Nico Schrijver warns, “if we are not careful, a question may 
arise as to how long the prohibition to the use of force still qualifies to 
be viewed as a jus cogens norm ‘accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted.’”151 Therefore, to prevent rendering the 
Charter’s principle against the use of force irrelevant, it is necessary to 
define boundaries on how Responsibility to Protect interventions are 
executed. 
VI.  REMEDIES 
Critics of NATO’s actions in Libya, rather than calling for critical 
review and repercussions for these violations, ask politely that these acts 
not become precedent for further expansion of the Charter’s exception 
to the prohibition of the use of force.152 Thus, the UN Charter’s limits on 
the use of force have finally been rendered toothless and there is no 
incentive to fall within its bounds.153 Without specific recourse in the 
form of remedy, a polite request to reconsider is not enough.154 For 
states that have signed and ratified the Rome Statute, the International 
Criminal Court is a potential option to investigate and implement a 
remedy.155 Otherwise, to prevent this sort of violation in the future, the 
responsibility remains with member states to authorize any forthcoming 
resolutions where the use of force is under consideration.156  
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A.  Adjudication to Set Specific Boundaries for the Use  
of Force: Several Opportunities 
1.  The ICC 
a.  Referral of Violating Countries Like Libya  
to the ICC Prior to UNSC Authorization 
In 2011, Libya and Qaddafi were referred to the ICC for 
investigation and prosecution.157 This action was unprecedented, as 
Libya is not a party to the Rome Statute.158 The UNSC, which is party to 
the statute, referred Qaddafi and Libya’s government as violators of 
international human rights law.159 This action represents a major step in 
the development of the Responsibility to Protect into a doctrine of 
international legal legitimacy. In their article, Stop the Killing, Michael 
Contarino and Selena Lucent proposed that juridical process to analyze 
whether Responsibility to Protect action is necessary, would serve both 
a determination function and an action function:  
[o]ver time, juridical R[esponsibility to Protect] determination could 
produce a body of R[esponsibility to Protect] jurisprudence that 
would clarify the bases for legal international interventions, and 
thereby facilitate effective, legal enforcement actions. Such 
jurisprudence, by clearly defining legal options, also would render 
the illegal military interventions feared by R[esponsibility to Protect] 
critics more difficult to justify. Accordingly, a juridical 
R[esponsibility to Protect] determination mechanism might well 
prove better able than the present system both to protect vulnerable 
populations and discourage violations of the norm of peace by 
nations using R[esponsibility to Protect] opportunistically and/or 
unilaterally taking R[esponsibility to Protect] into their own hands.160 
Currently, calls to refer Syria to the ICC echo within the 
international legal community.161 Through the powers and processes of 
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the ICC, the Responsibility to Protect can be strengthened and tamed 
into a potentially safe, effective, and legal method to combat 
humanitarian crisis.  
b.   ICC Prosecution of War Crimes to Serve as Deterrent for NATO  
In order to solidify the boundaries of the Responsibility to Protect 
and prevent the “mission creep” that turns humanitarian action into 
regime change, serious ICC investigation and possible prosecution of 
any war crimes by NATO in Libya would establish legitimate 
repercussions, something that many critics of international law say is 
frequently lacking.162 With no enforcement or remedial mechanism, the 
Responsibility to Protect tenets carry little force. Libya presents an 
opportunity to legitimize and set true boundaries on the implementation 
of the Responsibility to Protect.  
An ICC investigation could be a tool to do just that. NATO 
officials “say that between March and October NATO warplanes flew 
twenty-six thousand sorties, including more than 9,600 strike missions, 
destroying more than one thousand tanks, vehicles, and guns, as well as 
buildings claimed to have housed ‘command and control’ centers.”163 
Targeted facilities included Qaddafi’s “heavily fortified compound in 
Tripoli, [and] also residential homes of his supporters - targets which 
could be considered outside the UN mandate.”164 Currently, NATO 
meets suggestions that it investigate these issues with an air of willing 
cooperation.165 Friction is likely, however, because individual Member 
States that participated in the air strikes have called the allegations 
“libel.”166 ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo faces political pressure 
to avoid opening a formal investigation and speaks of a potential 
investigation with caution and diplomacy.167 Despite political pressures 
and distinct repercussions that certain member states face if formally 
investigated and prosecuted, standing up to such forces presents an 
opportunity to effect international use of force law in an important 
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manner.   
The threat of repercussions for member states that violate law in 
the course of military intervention would instill legitimacy in the 
Responsibility to Protect. Thus, any headway made by the 
Responsibility to Protect towards becoming a norm of international law 
would pose less of a threat to the principles behind the UN Charter, 
making the Responsibility to Protect a more palatable exception to the 
prohibition against the use of force.  
NATO is not a signatory to the Rome Statute, therefore 
prosecution by the ICC would be geared toward member state 
signatories.168 ICC jurisdiction and subsequent punishment is only 
applicable to those who have signed and ratified the Rome Statute, 
leaving certain member states, e.g., the United States, technically free 
from submission to its jurisdiction.169 Yet, prosecution of sister states 
may still have an influence on countries that have an interest in abiding 
by, or appearing to abide by, similar standards. With the United States’ 
newfound warmth toward the ICC, this threat could nonetheless have a 
deterrent effect.170  
 2.  The ICJ 
The ICJ, the United Nations judicial organ under UN Charter 
Article 92, is arguably the appropriate venue for review of UNSC 
resolutions.171 As with the U.S. Constitution, the UN Charter does not 
enumerate judicial review.172 Yet in the United States, the concept and 
practice of judicial review was legitimized by case law and has a long-
standing precedent.173 Traditionally, much tension has existed between 
the UNSC and the ICJ, as judicial review has not been formally 
incorporated as a concept as it has been in the United States.174 Given 
that the two bodies of the UN have occasionally overlapping functions, 
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any advisory ruling by the ICJ on a UNSC resolution may be met with 
skepticism and highlight the Court’s lack of authority.175  
 In the Lockerbie bombing case, the ICJ ruled, “judicial review is 
an evolutionary process.”176 Still, the court declined to exercise judicial 
review of UNSC Resolutions 731177 and 748178 (the former requested 
Libya’s compliance regarding the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and 
the latter instituted sanctions on Libya). The ICJ is nonetheless “a 
‘court’ charged with interpretation of ‘law,’” and is thus an appropriate 
mechanism from which to seek guidance in requesting an advisory 
opinion on issues such as whether the UNSC’s Resolution 1973 and 
NATO’s subsequent actions in Libya were lawful.179  
 The ICJ is charged with applying international customary law 
in its decisions:180 
Under the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the ICJ is 
bound to decide cases “in accordance with international law” and to 
apply “international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law.” Customary law “owes its legal form to its 
acceptance as law by the international community.” Its application 
has frequently required the Court to look to “proof of the pertinent 
contemporary international [community] standard.” It is important to 
note in this respect that the classical definition of customary law has 
evolved from the traditional concept of the behavior of states to 
include the behavior of organizations, like the United Nations, that 
are composed of states.181 
With this in mind, a finding that NATO’s actions in Libya under 
Resolution 1973, as part of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, 
qualifies as customary international law is unlikely given that, in its 
current form, the Responsibility to Protect was essentially untested 
before 2011. That is, no precedent exists. The ramifications of such a 
decision are unknown. An ICJ advisory opinion may however serve to 
sharpen the requirements and expectations of any further military course 
of action under the same or similar pretense, and ensure that the action 
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complies more closely to the provisions of the UN Charter.  
B.   The UNSC Veto  
The veto power of the five permanent members of the UNSC 
provides a built-in safeguard to “reduce many unnecessary conflicts in 
international relations.”182 A veto by any of the permanent members 
prevents UNSC authorization of the use of force, while an abstention 
does not.183 For example, in 2007, China and Russia voted against a 
resolution that “characterized the situation in Burma as constituting ‘a 
threat to international peace and security,’” blocking implementation of 
the Responsibility to Protect.184 The ICISS’s report on the 
Responsibility to Protect calls upon the permanent five members of the 
Security Council to refrain from exercising their veto power “in matters 
where its vital state interests are not involved,” if their veto would 
obstruct the passage of resolutions that authorize military humanitarian 
intervention for which there is otherwise majority support.185 While 
there is no legal restriction on the use of the veto power with regard to 
the Responsibility to Protect, the request that members abstain rather 
than veto, attempts to restrict the veto power by placing “political and 
moral pressure on the five permanent members.”186 
The passage of UNSC Resolution 1973 was unobstructed by China 
and Russia, both of whom chose to abstain rather than to exercise their 
veto power, perhaps under this “political and moral pressure.”187 For a 
time, it appeared that China’s growing world power suggested that its 
status as “persistent objector” to humanitarian intervention might be a 
thing of the past as it is no longer in danger of intervention on its own 
soil.188 Yet China’s unwillingness to allow passage of a resolution to 
authorize the use of force in Syria suggests that China’s role as objector 
remains active. Libya arguably served as a test case for the objectors, 
China and Russia, wherein they allowed intervention to move forward 
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despite concern that the intervention would be used to advance political 
interests and violate state sovereignty.189  
The stage was set for the Responsibility to Protect to gain 
legitimacy, yet given how the intervention played out, it was the 
importance and purpose of the veto that was reinforced.190 The veto is 
one of few measures that can prevent the Responsibility to Protect from 
being used as a tool for an individual State to “pursue its self-
interests.”191 Thus, reclaiming the veto power as such a safeguard is one 
way to insist that thinly guised political agendas that destabilize the true 
intent of the Responsibility to Protect do not prevail again.192 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The future of the UN Charter’s prohibition against the use of force 
is precarious. To interventionists in the United States and Europe, 
intervention in Libya under the Responsibility to Protect doctrine was 
considered a success - moving the Responsibility to Protect closer to 
becoming a norm of international law.193 Yet the fact still remains that 
NATO’s actions in Libya contradicted the UN Charter’s prohibition 
against the use of force to intervene in what most say was a civil war.194 
While many recognize a responsibility to protect, mission creep 
subsumed the humanitarian objective.195 Despite the humanitarian 
principle that theoretically supported the intervention, political agendas 
were not adequately separated from the altruistic goal.196 Calling an 
intervention “humanitarian” does not transform the action to one that 
meets the standards of international legality.  
History once again challenges the precepts and functionality of 
international law as the situation in Syria worsens. The lessons learned 
from Libya have not yet been fully processed and the international 
community now faces pressure to throw aside a doctrine it has fought to 
invest with legal legitimacy.197 As of February 2013, the civilian death 
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toll approaches seventy thousand.198 Two Western journalists have been 
killed.199 In February 2012, reports of Iranian war boats docked in 
Syrian ports and the possibility of nuclear capability in Iran came from 
the region.200 Political hackles are raised from Israel to the United States 
and back to China. As matters progress in Syria, it becomes clear that 
what the West construes as “humanitarianism” in Syria is fraught with 
potential disaster on a global scale.201 Executive Director of the Global 
Center for the Responsibility to Protect Simon Adams says, “[i]f Libya 
showed us how far we’ve come, then Syria has shown us how far we 
have to go.”202 Others call for relinquishing the “desperate 
triumphalism” of the pro-Libyan interventionist and “come to grips with 
their pyrrhic victory in Libya.”203 
For the Responsibility to Protect to maintain any ground it may 
have gained with the Libyan intervention, it is necessary for NATO to 
receive UNSC authorization prior to intervening.204 Yet UNSC 
authorization of even a watered down resolution with regard to Syria is 
a near impossibility.205 Until December 2012, when Russia publicly 
distanced itself from Assad,206 Russia and China remained firmly 
positioned against any kind of intervention in Syria and thrice vetoed a 
resolution that called for an end to Assad’s violence.207 Brazil, India, 
South Africa and Lebanon abstained in the second UNSC vote and 
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South Africa and Pakistan abstained in the July 2012 vote, indicating a 
“major divide within the Security Council.”208 The UNSC’s failure to 
pass the resolutions “is directly related to the actions of the NATO-led 
intervention in Libya, during which the United States and its allies 
overtly overstepped the UN mandate authorizing action.”209  
With Chinese and Russian interests strong in Syria and the bad 
taste lingering in the wake of intervention in Libya, it does not appear 
that the Responsibility to Protect in its imagined form will be the 
mechanism through which intervention in Syria will be initiated.210 
“Security Council deadlock and buyer’s remorse among UN member 
states have led some to suggest that R[eponsibility to Protect] is 
dead.”211 The vetoed resolution before the UNSC did not rise to the level 
of actually authorizing the use of force, yet the vetoing members took a 
strong stand against what they believe to be a slippery slope that 
inevitably leads to the use of force.212 Originally, it was argued that 
China and Russia’s vetoes were premature and prevented Syria from 
receiving humanitarian aid that was needed immediately.213 
Responsibility to Protect proponents wished that Russia and China 
would simply abstain and get out of the way. However, with the Red 
Cross’ July 2012 announcement that Syria is in a state of civil war, 
Russia and China, who tout state sovereignty as a reason to veto the 
UNSC resolutions, are arguably vindicated under international law.214 
To many, the vetoes point to a functioning UNSC system and will 
prevent what happened in Libya from happening in Syria.  
As the “civil war” rages on in Syria, intervention will now largely 
be determined by an analysis of the declaration of civil war and whether 
it forecloses legal international intervention by virtue of the sovereignty 
argument or whether this particular civil war constitutes a threat to 
peace and security in the region, thus making intervention permissible 
under the UN Charter’s exception.215 With Syria in a state of civil war, 
a broader range of international humanitarian law applies.216 However, a 
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collapse of the Assad regime arguably threatens “peace and security” in 
the region to a much larger degree, with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel and 
Palestine all having major interests in the outcome.217  
Evidence of the disturbance of peace and security in the region 
was solidified on August 15, 2012, when an abduction of more than 
twenty Syrians occurred within Lebanese territory. Their captors called 
the incident “revenge for the kidnapping of a Lebanese relative by 
rebels inside Syria.”218 Further, the United Nations refugee agency 
reported that the more than 857,712 refugees registered or awaiting 
registration in Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt and North Africa 
are overwhelming relief efforts.219 Thus, it seems that obituaries for the 
Responsibility to Protect are “premature.”220 From this standpoint, it is 
arguable that the Russian and Chinese vetoes no longer point to a 
functioning UNSC system but rather symbolize a closely held political 
agenda that stands in the way of an intervention deserving of legal 
support.  
Now it is up to the international community to find a politically 
and legally acceptable way to provide Syria with some humanitarian 
relief.221 This need not signal an end to the Responsibility to Protect if 
the international community can refrain from pursuing intervention 
without UNSC authorization—a goal which may simply be too lofty.222 
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If NATO decides, as it has done in the past, to use force without 
authorization, the Responsibility to Protect might as well be discarded 
as a possible legal norm. The UN Charter’s prohibition faces a similar 
fate—one of much greater consequence.  
The tide of history moves quickly forward. The UN Charter and its 
principles, stand as foundational pilings. They have taken a beating. An 
interval of calm to repair and reinforce would be convenient; yet, that is 
not what history allows. Now, despite the current climate, it is more 
important than ever to use the tools that law has set out to reinforce 
those principles. The veto, as used by UNSC member states, is one such 
tool. Review of Resolution 1973 by the ICJ should commence, as 
should an investigation of NATO’s actions in Libya by the ICC. The 
pressure to make quick decisions about Syria should not prevent the 
repair and improvements that need to be undertaken to ensure that 
future interventions conform to international law. These measures are 
necessary to reinforce the legitimacy of the principles of the UN Charter 
and international legal order. Without such action, we risk being swept 
up by the immediacy of perceived humanitarian crisis, and those 
foundational pilings may not weather another storm.   
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